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1. Introduction 
J. D. Geanakoplos and H. M. Polemarchakis (1986) henceforth, GP 
showed that when real assets are traded in two-period economies with 
more than a single good, and markets are incomplete, then the equilib-
rium allocation is constrained suboptimal, i.e., even if the "planner" is 
restricted to using only the existing assets to obtain the reallocation, 
he is able to induce an improvement over the equilibrium allocation. 
This result has become a cornerstone for subsequent research in the 
area; in particular, it sheds light onto the open question of analyz-
ing the optimality of equilibrium allocations in pure exchange OLG 
economies with sequentially incomplete markets when price effects 
are allowed for. 
The key feature of the proof by GP is to show that (i) with 
incomplete markets, the ratios of marginal utilities of income across 
states differ generically across agents, a result which they use to show 
that (ii) with more than a single commodity, a price effect can be 
induced in such a way as to cause a welfare improvement. To prove 
result (i) above, GP perturb asset prices at equilibrium when the 
degree of market incompleteness equals one. However, since prices 
are not fundamentals that parameterize the economy, a generic result 
cannot be obtained in such a way. Accordingly we provide, in section 
5, an alternative proof of result (i) above which does not depend on 
the dimension of the market incompleteness and in which utilities and 
endowments are perturbed. 
Also, the original proof by GP of result (ii) above, though correct 
and brilliant, skips many details in order to shorten the presentation. 
We believe that understanding the problem requires one to have the 
relevant details and, accordingly, we provide them and complete the 
arguments following the sketches given by GP. In this respect, our 
endeavor allows the reader to appreciate better the nature of the 
contribution of GP. 
To prove that a welfare improvement is derived from a relative 
price effect, one must show that a property of linear independence is 
generically satisfied for a set of vectors derived from the income effect 
vectors.
1 To guarantee that this property holds, an upper bound 
needs to be imposed on the number of agents, as GP do, which in turn 
requires that the number of agents relative to the number of goods 
in the economy be sufficiently small. This is controversial since, from 
1 For each agent, an income effect vector reflects the changes in his demand 
for commodities as a consequence of changes in his income. SUBOPTIMALITY RESULT 113 
the competitive equilibrium perspective, one usually has in mind an 
economy where the number of agents is large relative to the number 
of commodities. Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998) henceforth, 
CKV have proved the GP result without imposing an upper bound on 
the number of agents. However, their description of the intervention 
differs from the one used by GP in that (a) agents are allowed to 
retrade the assets allocated at the intervention, and (b) the planner 
makes lump-sum transfers in some goods. As we show, the result by 
CKV follows precisely because feature (b) allows for a direct control 
of the income effect vectors. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents 
the model and notation. Section 3 presents the tools that permit us 
to analyze the effects of the asset reallocation. In section 4 we obtain 
two linear independence results derived from the description of the 
economy. Section 5 deals with the marginal utilities of income of the 
agents when markets are incomplete. Section 6 presents a technical 
result on linear algebra, and section 7 completes the proof. 
2. The Model 
We consider a multigood, two-period (t = 0,1), exchange economy 
under uncertainty in which one state s from a finite set of states S = 
{0,1,..., S} occurs at date 1. There is a finite set 1 = {0,1,..., /} 
of two-period lived agents who consume only at date 1 and reallocate 
their income across states by trading securities at date 0. The set of 
commodities is C = {0,1,..., L}. Since there are L + 1 commodities 
available in each state s e S, the commodity space is R
n with n = 
(L + + 1). 
Each agent i e I is described by (i) a consumption set X
i C IT, 
(ii) an initial endowment vector of the L + 1 goods in each state 
s, := (4,"i,...,4), where wj := (wj,, wi„ ..., wjj and u\s 
denotes the endowment of commodity I e C that agent i has in state 
a, and (iii) a utility function u
l : X
1 - R defined over consumption 
bundles x
{ := (4, x\,..., 4) e X\ where x\ := (x^, x\s,4J 









i+1) and x := (x°, x\...,x
I)e 
denote, respectively, a vector of endowments and an allocation of 
commodities. 
There is a set A = {0,1,..., A} of inside real assets which pay a 
return in terms of commodity 0 in each state s e S denoted, for a e A, 114 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
by ra(s) G R. For a € A, we define ra := (ra(0), rQ(l),..., ra(S)) G 
R
s+1, the payoff vector of asset a. For s G <S, we define r(s) := 
(ro(s),ri(s),... ,r^(s)) G R
A+1, the vector of asset returns in state 
s. Let 
r0(0) n(0) ... rA(0)l 
r0(l) ri(l) ... rA(l) 
r0{S) ri(S) ... rA(S). 
be the corresponding matrix of returns, of dimension {S + l)x(A + l). 
We denote the quantity of asset a held by agent i by G R, a 
port/o/to of agent i by 0
l := flj,..., ^) G R
A+1, and an allocation 





We assume throughout the paper that 
ASSUMPTION A.i. Endowments and Preferences of the Agents: For 
each i G J; (i) w* G R^+, (ii) u
{ is C
2, strictly increasing, and differ-
entiably strictly quasi-concave, and (hi) if U^k) := {y G R
n : M%) 
> u^k)}, then U^k) c R!^+ for each k e R!^+. 
ASSUMPTION A.2. Asset Structure: (i) R has full column rank, (ii) 
there exists a portfolio 9 G U
A+
1
 such that R • 9 > 0,
2 (iii) ^ < S, 
and (iv) each set of A + 1 rows of ii is linearly independent. 
Assumptions A.I and A.2 are standard. Assumption A.I (iii) says 
that the closure of the indifference curves of each agent does not 
intersect the boundary of R™. Also, we have assumed that the asset 




 : T = R-9,9 G H
A+1} then (R) C R
S+
1
 with (R) / R
s+1, 
i e the asset structure does not allow agents to transfer income fully 
across states. 
To ease part of the proof we assume that utilities satisfy a vN-M 
utility form. 
ASSUMPTION A.3. Additively Separable Utilities: For each agent 




 R, and a 
2 When comparing two vectors x and y of the same dimension we use the 
symbols "<", and "<" to indicate xk<yk for each k but x ± y, and xk < yk 
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probability distribution (pi)seS G R*
+1, such that u^x') := £a65pj 
v^xi) for each x
l G X\ 
We denote the vector of commodity prices by p := (Po,Pl,... ,Ps) G 
R™, where Ps := (p0s,Pu, • • -,PLs) and Pu is the price of commodity 
(90,9i, • • •, e M
A+1 denote the vector of 
asset pTiceS) wh6r6 Qa, is the price' of asset a. We choose commodity 
0 as numeraire and normalize its price to 1 in each state s e S. 
Analogously, we normalize the price of asset 0 by setting q0 := 1. Let 
R» 
— 1 for each s G S} and Q := {q G R/
l+
1
 : 90 = 
1} denote, respectively, the normalized price domain for commodities 
and for assets. 
For two vectors a = (au a2,..., a„) and 0 = (ft, ft,..., ft,), 
with w G N, where, for each fc = 1,...,«;, Qfc and ft lie in some 
Euclidean space such that the product ak • ft is well defined, we 
define the box product a • ¡3 := (ai • ft, a2 • ft, ...,<*„, • JM-
For a commodity price vector p G V and an asset price vector 
q G Q, we define the contingent spot-financial market budget set of 
agent i by 
B^p^) := {(x^e^ E X
i xU
A+1 : g • 0* < 0,p • (a;
4 - u/) < R • O
1}. 
Since we will obtain a generic result, we have to work with a 
set of economies rather than with only one. Such a set is obtained 
via a parameterization of the economy based on both fundamentals, 
utilities and endowments. So, the characteristics of the economy are 
summarized by the collection of utility functions and endowment vec-
tors of the agents; let (u, OJ) := (u°, ...,«V°,...,w
J). We denote 
the space of utility functions by U and the space of endowment vec-
tors by il Let r := U x fi denote the space of economies that we 
consider; i.e., we obtain a parameterized family of economies. We say 
that a set of economies is generic if it is an open set of full measure 
in the space T. 
Now we can define equilibrium 
DEFINITION 1 (CE). We say that (x*, 6*,p*,q*) is a Competitive Equi-
librium, (CE) of the economy {u,w) G T if 
« 00 £<(*'*-"0 < 0; 
(b) J2i
e%" = 0, 
(ii) for each iel; 116 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
(a) (**\OGBV,<r); 
(b) ifu^x*) > u^x
1") for some x








 denote the function 
defined by the fact that, for each (p,q) G V x Q, (f
i(p,q),C(p,q)) 
solves the problem 
max u V) subject to q • 8
i < 0 and p • (x
¿ - w
4) < R • 9\ 
Let the function F : V x Q -> R" defined by F(p,9) := 
(p, g) - w*] for each (p, 9) G 7> x Q denote the aggregate excess demand 
function for goods with spot-financial markets. Also, let the function 
f:Pxg-t H
A+1 defined by $(p, 9) := £V C*(p, 9) for each (p, 9) G 
V x Q denote the aggregate excess deman/function for assets with 
estoy en e spot-financial markets. 
For a commodity price vector p £ V and a portfolio 0* G H
A+1, 




i : p • - a;') < ii • 9*}. 
For i G I, let g




4 denote the function defined, 
for each (p, 9
i)eVx M
A+1, by 






i = 0, we say that (x**,p**) is a Spot Market Compet-
itive Equilibrium (SM-CE) of the economy (U,UJ) G T if 
(i) -u^Q, 
(ii) /or each i el; x
r* = g^p**, 9% 
Let the function G : V x R,(^+I)(*+I) _> ]R" defined by G(p, 0) := 
y iqHp 9
l) - w'l for each (p 0) G 7> x ]R(
j4+1)(
i+1) denote the aoore-
5a£e excess demand function for goods with spot markets. 
REMARK 1. Consider a pair (p, 9) G V x Q. For each i G J, we 
have that if (^,0*) G !?*(?,«), then a* G B'iM
4)- Therefore, if SUBOPTIMALITY RESULT 117 
{x*,6*,p*, q*) is a CE, then (x*,p*) is a SM-CE for the asset allocation 
0*. 
REMARK 2. By invoking Walras' law, we shall consider markets 
for just L commodities in each state, and for A assets; commod-
ity 0 and asset 0 correspond to the "dropped" markets. Therefore, 
for i 6 X, we denote by /* = (f{0, ...,/*„,..., f{s,/£5) the 
truncation of f\ and by F = (Fio, • • •, FL0,FiS,..., FLS) and 
(j> = ...; ijr^ respectively, the truncation of F and the trunca-
tion of <J>, each of them being defined on the normalized price domain 
VxO Analogously let a
i = (ain a\ a
i c a\ a) and G — 
(Gin ' GLo G1S Grs)'denote respectively 
of g' and the truncation of G, both of them being defined on the nor-







l = (z\0,..., z
l
L0,.. . , 
z{s,zis) denote, respectively, the truncation olx\ the truncation 
of OJ\ and the truncation of z\ 
The notion of optimality used is the benchmark for incomplete 
asset markets. It applies the concept of Pareto efficiency to the econ-
omy above, but imposing that any alternative allocation be traded in 
the existing markets. This yields the criterion of constrained Pareto 
optimality, due to Stiglitz (1982), and Newbery and Stiglitz (1982). 
DEFINITION 3 (CS). An allocation (x,6) is Constrained Suboptimal, 
CS, if there exists an alternative allocation (x,6), and a price vector 
p e V such that 
(i) (x,p) is a SM-CE for the asset allocation 0, 
(ii) (a) u^F) > u^x*) for each i G I; 
(b) ui(xi) > ui(xi) for some j G 1. 
So, an allocation is CS if a (benevolent) "central planner" is able, 
by redistributing agents' assets and by allowing agents to retrade 
only goods, to induce a new equilibrium allocation of goods that 
Pareto dominates the original allocation. Of course, there will be 
also a new supporting equilibrium price vector associated with the 
new equilibrium allocation, as stated in Definition 3. 
We can now state the GP result. 
THEOREM 1 (GP). Assume A.l, A.2, and A.3, and that 0 < 2L < I < 
LS, and A>1. Then there exists a generic set of economies f c T 
such that, for each economy (u,ui) G f, each CE is CS. 118 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
3. Preliminaries 
The objective of this section is to present the problem as one of in-
tervention by a "central planner" and to introduce the tools which 
will allow us to interpret its effects on the agents' welfare. As a first 
step, we present two results on the generic regularity of the set of 
economies described. 
To do this, we need first to set a notational convention. For any 
function H parameterized by the fundamentals of the economy (u, w), 
Hy denotes the function H such that parameter y G {u, w, («, w)} is 
fixed; e.g., (F, *)<„,„) denotes the (truncated) aggregate excess de-
mand function for goods and assets for the specific economy («,w) G 
T, and (F, $)„ denotes the (truncated) aggregate excess demand func-
tion for goods and assets for an economy with a fixed utility parameter 
u G U when the endowment u G ii is allowed to vary. 
PROPOSITION 1. Generic Regularity: Assume A.l, A.2 (i) and (ii), 
then, for each u eU, there exists a generic set g{u) C 9, such that, 
for each OJ G Q(U), (F,*)U is a continuously differentiable function 
with respect to OJ. 
PROOF. (GP) • 
Let Ti := {(«,«) G F : u G U},UJ G g(u) denote the generic set 
of economies identified in Proposition 1. 
Since, by Proposition 1, equilibria are locally isolated (i.e., for 
each equilibrium, there is no other equilibrium arbitrarily close to 
it, so that each equilibrium depends in a continuous manner on the 
fundamentals of the economy), utility functions can be perturbed by 
the addition of a quadratic term in a way such that the linear term 
subsequently added to the vector of the first derivatives amounts to 
zero at the equilibrium allocation. Therefore, the perturbation leaves 
unaffected demand but it changes the matrix of second derivatives 
of the utility function. Using this fact, it can be shown that any 
perturbation of each of the derivatives Dpg\ i G J, by the addition 
of a symmetric matrix, can be induced by adding a suitably chosen 
quadratic term to the utility function of agent i.
3 GP use this result 
to prove the next proposition. 
PROPOSITION 2. Generic Strong Regularity: Assume A.l, A.2 (i) and 
(ii), then there exists a generic set of economies T2 C Vi such that, for 
3 See, e.g., Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1980). SUBOPTIMALITY RESULT 119 
each (u,w) G T2 and each feasible asset allocation 6 G 
the Jacobian matrix DpG(p*,6), evaluated at the SM-CE prices p* G 
V associated with 9, is invertible. 
PROOF. (GP) • 
We will now introduce a (benevolent) "central planner", who 
reallocates the existing assets before trade takes place. After that in-
tervention, agents are allowed to trade in the markets for goods to the 
point where a new equilibrium in the commodity markets is achieved. 
However, they are not allowed to retrade the portfolio they were as-
signed; i.e., the original equilibrium is a CE and the new equilibrium 
is a SM-CE associated with the new asset allocation. We must show 
that, for a generic set of economies, the allocation of commodities 
induced by the new asset reallocation is Pareto improving. 
The asset redistribution directly affects the income of the agents 
and, since more than a single good is traded, it also changes com-
modity prices in the spot markets at date 1. Both types of effects 
change the budget sets of the agents and therefore their consumption 
possibilities. However, intuitively we can see that the direct effect 
of any feasible asset reallocation on the income of the agents does 
not permit a Pareto improvement since only a redistribution of a 
fixed amount of income takes place, so that improving the welfare 
of an agent necessarily implies reducing that of another. Therefore, 
we should concentrate on analyzing the effects on welfare due to the 
price effect that results from the reallocation of assets. 
Given a pair (p, q) G V x Q, consider the optimization problem 
of an agent i G I 
max uV) subject to q • 9
i < 0 and p • {x
i - UJ
1) < R • 8\ (P) 






i)=pD X\ (c2) 
where p} and A* = (Aj, Aj,..., A*s) are, respectively, the Lagrange 
multipliers corresponding to the budget constraints on assets and on 
the spot market for agent i in each state s. 
From (c2) above, by noting that du^x*) := D^u^x*) • dx\ the 
change in utility of agent i due to a marginal change in his consump-
tion plan is 120 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
d«V) = y • [P • oV] (i) 
Now we can consider the changes induced by such an asset pertur-
bation on the agents' consumption plans. So, by taking infinitesimal 
perturbations of 0
i that induce changes on x
i and on p, and by com-
puting the total differential of the contingent spot market budget 






a condition that must be satisfied by the changes induced by the asset 
reallocation. Then, by combining equations (1) and (2), we obtain 
du V) = A* • R • d9
i - X
i • {x
i - • dp. (3) 
The first element in equation (3) above reflects the direct effect of the 
asset reallocation on the utility of agent i due to a perturbation of his 
income, and the second reflects the contribution due to the change in 
relative prices. We turn now to a more detailed analysis of this price 
effect. 
Consider an initial CE (x*,6*,p*,q*) of an economy (u,w) G T2. 
By noting Remark 1 and that the budget constraints of problem (P) 
above hold with equality at the solution, given assumption A.l, we 
have that G(p*,6*) = 0. Now, by considering infinitesimal pertur-
bations on p* and on 0*, and by computing the total differential, we 
obtain 
DpG{p*, 0*) • dp + DeG(p*, 0*)-d0 = O. 
From the Strong Regularity result, Proposition 2, we know that, for 
economies (u,w) G r2, DpG(p*,0*) is invertible so that, by applying 
the Implicit Function Theorem, 
dp  DpG{p*,8*) -DeG{p*,0*)-d0 (4) 
holds in a neighborhood of the initial SM-CE {x*,p*) associated with 
8*. Hence, our problem has been reduced to specifying an asset per-
turbation where the change in utility of each agent i G I is given by 
(3), and the change in prices is determined by the matrix DeG{p*, 0*), 
of dimension L{S + 1) x (A + 1)(7 + 1), that appears in equation (4). 
For the original SM-CE (x*,p*) associated with the initial asset 
allocation 9*, by applying equation (3) combined with equation (4) SUBOPTIMALITY RESULT 121 
to each agent i G 1 (considering truncated bundles), we obtain the 
matrix equation 
-l 
•D«G(p*.**))-d0, (5)  du(x*) = [\*-R+\*-iP(x*)a [DpG(p*,d*) 












T .  • [Q]
T ] 
• [QF 
, R := 
•R 0 . 





T •  . [A
7*]











with A being of dimension (7 + 1) x (S + l)(7+l), R being of dimension 
(S + l)(I + l)x(A + 1)(7 + 1), and V(x*) being of dimension L(S + 
1)(/+1) x (7+1). 
For the given SM-CE (x*,p*), and for 0*, let O(x*,p*,0*) denote 
the matrix, of dimension (7 + 1) x (A + 1)(7 + 1), defined by 
o(x*,p*,e*):=x* -ii>(x*)a [Dpdip^e*)]"
1 -DeG(p*,e*). (6) 
Also, for i e 1, let Vs*(p*) = (Vi(p*), ..., V[s{p*)) e R
L denote 
the vector of income effects of agent i in state s at p*; i.e., 
owl 
where w* := r(s) • 6
i for i £ X and s G <S, the change, at the given 
SM-CE, in the demand for good I G £\{0} by agent i in state a due 
an infinitesimal change of his income in that state. We set V
f (p") := 
(Vj(p*),... ,V£(p*)) G R
i,(s+1). Now, since, for i G I, I G £\{0}, 
a G S, and a G A, we have 122 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
^^0 = ra(«)W), 
the matrix Deg^p*, 9
1*), of dimension L(S + 1) x (A + + 1), can 





where the non-null columns correspond to the changes in the demand 
of agent i due to the changes in the portfolio of that agent while the 
null vectors correspond to the changes induced by the variations in 
the portfolio of agents other than i. 
We turn now to specify the asset reallocation that we consider. 
The proposed asset reallocation is such that agent 0 gifts asset 0 
to each agent j £ J\{0} and gifts asset 1 to agent 1. Let e M 
denote a transfer of asset a that agent j £ X\{0} receives from agent 0. 
The changes in asset holdings associated with the asset reallocation 








A9° := (-^24,-rl,0,...,0), A9






M, 0, 0,..., 0) for each m £ X\{0,1}, 
so that the vector Ad has I + 1 non-zero entries that can be set 
"independently". Let r := (T0\ r0
2,..., rj, T}) denote a vector of asset 
transfers that must be chosen to lie in the space of transfers T := 
REMARK 3. By using the proposed asset reallocation, for each A9 £ 
R(A+i)(/+i\ there is a unique T £ T that fully specifies A9. 
With this intervention, by noting (7), we obtain the changes 
induced in the demand of the agents: 
(a) Dgg°(p*, 9°*) • A9 = -r0 • V
o(p*) £>¿ - n • V°(p>í. SUBOPTIMALITY RESULT 123 
(b) Deg\p*: e
1*) • A9 = r0 • V
l{p*)r^ + n • v\P*)rl 
(c) Deg
m(p*,e
m*) • A0 = r0 • K
m(p*)r0
m for each m e I\ {0,1}. 
Then, since DgG(p*, 9*) • A0 = £\ Deg^P*, 0
4*) • A0, we obtain, 
for an asset reallocation A9 specified by means r e T, 
DeG{p\9*)-A9 = k{p*)-r, (8) 
where A{p*) denotes the matrix, of dimension L(S + 1) x (I + 1), 
specified by 
A(p*) :=  r0 • [V
1^*) - V°(p*)} r0 D [V'ip*) - V°(p*)] 
n • [K
1^*) - v V)]  (9) 
From equation (5), using the matrix specified in (6), and taking 
into account the proposed reallocation, we have that 
du(x*) = (A* • R + 0{x*,P*, 0*)) • A9. 
So, our objective is to analyze whether for a generic set of econo-
mies the rank of matrix (A* • R + 0(x*,p*,9*)), of dimension (7 + 
1) x (A + 1)(7 + 1), equals (7 + 1) so that, by choosing appropriately 
the vector AO, any du(x*) e can be generated. A standard 
argument shows that the rank of matrix A* • R cannot be 7 + 1 since 
it only captures the effect of a pure redistribution of income. It follows 
that to prove Theorem T, it suffices to show that matrix <D(x*,p*, 9*) 
has rank 7 + 1 for a generic set of economies. By noting Remark 3 
and by using (6) together with (8), we obtain that, for each A9 € 
]R(A+i)(/+i)> there ig a unique T 6 j sudl that 
DpG(p*,9*)  A(p*) 
Then, it suffices to show that the matrix $(x*,p*,<T), of dimen-
sion (7 + 1) x (7 + 1), specified by 124 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
$(x*,p*,0*) := A* • ip{x*) •  DpG(p*,9*)  A(p*), 
where A(p*) is the matrix specified in (9), has rank / +1 for a generic 
set of economies. To prove this, we will show that, generically, there is 
no 6 G A
i+
1
 := {y G R+
+
1
 : £fc yk = 1} such that 6 - ${x*,p*, 9*) = 
[0]
T-
The proof will be completed in two steps. 
STEP 1. We will show, in Proposition 4, that generically any matrix 
obtained by dropping from A(p*) the vectors that correspond to any 
state has rank 7 + 1. 
STEP 2. We will show in section 7 that, for S G A
/+1, by suitably per-
turbing (u,«),we can alter as we wish at least LS entries (that corre-
spond to at least S states) of the vector S-X*-tp(x*) • [DpG{p* ,9*)]~
l, 
leaving [DpG(p*, 9*)}"
1 unchanged. To do so, we use a result from lin-
ear algebra provided in Lemma L, together with (i) the result on linear 
independence given in Proposition 3, and (ii) the property in Proposi-
tion 5, whereby there is a set of L + 1 agents {i0, h,..., iL} C J, such 
that, given 6 := {6^,6^,. ..,6ih) 6 A
L+1, generically, 0 ^ 6io • Xf* # 
Sim • A*™* for at least S states, for each m G {1, 2,..., L}. 
4. Linear Independence of the Income Effects 
In this section we obtain two properties of linear independence that 
the set of vectors {V°, V
1,..., V
1} generically satisfies. These results 
require that L > 0 and that preferences not be quasi-linear since 
otherwise income effects are absent. 
PROPOSITION 3. Assume A.l, A.2 (i) and (ii), then, for each subset 
ofL + 1 agents, {i0, h,..., iL} C I, and for each s G S, the set of 
vectors 
{K;
1 (p*) - Vs
io(p*), V^(p*) - V?(p*),Vs
iL(p*) - Vi°{p*)} 
is linearly independent, for a CE price p* of an economy in some 
generic set T3 C T. 
PROOF. Consider an arbitrary subset of L +1 agents {i0, h,..., iL} C 
1, and a given state s e S. Define the matrix, of dimension ixL, SUBOPTIMALITY RESULT 125 






L be the function 
specified by 
as(p,q,6) := [(F, *)(p, g), «5 • ns(p*) 
for each (p,q,6) e V x Q x A
L. Since utility functions can be per-
turbed without changing their first derivatives at the equilibrium al-
location, we are able to change v;(p*) for any i G X and for any a G 5, 
maintaining (F, *)(p*, q*) unaltered at the CE prices (p*, g*). There-
fore, by applying a transversality argument, we know that aa(u>u) is 
transverse to zero for each (it, OJ) G T3, where T3 C T is a generic set. 
Now, given that the dimension of the range of os{UtUl) exceeds that of 
the domain, by applying the Regular Value Theorem, ^(^(O) = 0 
for each (u,w) G T3. Therefore, Us{p*) has rank L for a generic set 
of economies T3. 
The result follows by noting that s was chosen arbitrarily. B 
Notice that, if this property holds, then, for any given a G S, the 
set of vectors {V^(p*) - v;°(p'), v;'(p*) - F>(P*),..., V^(p*) -
VV«(p*)} spanH^. 
For i G J\ {0}, a G {0,1}, and a G 5, let «J'*(p*) denote the 
vector, with LS coordinates, obtained from ra • [V^p*) - V°(p*)] 
by dropping the L coordinates that correspond to state a. 
PROPOSITION 4. Assume A.l, A.2 (i), (ii), and (iv), then, for each 
s G S, the set of vectors {^(p*),..., K°/(p*), ^(p*)} is linearly 
independent for a CE price p* of an economy in some generic set 
PROOF. Pick a state s G S. We decompose the proof into two steps. 
STEP i. From Assumption A.2 (iv) we know that the rank of each 
matrix of size (A + 1) x (A + 1) obtained by removing from matrix R 
any set of S - A rows equals A + l. Thus, any set of vectors obtained 
by considering, for each of the assets in A, the same A +1 coordinates 
of their corresponding vectors of payoffs is linearly independent. Since 
A + 1 > 2, we can choose two vectors from the set {r0, ru ..., rA} 126 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
such that they are linearly independent when restricted to any subset, 
of size A + 1, of their coordinates. Furthermore, since S > A + 1, 
we know that these two vectors are also linearly independent when 
restricted to S arbitrarily chosen coordinates. This result guarantees, 
in addition, that not all the coordinates of any of the vectors derived 
in that way equal zero.
4 
Consider, without loss of generality, that r0, n e B.
s+1 are 
the vectors chosen as described above. It follows that the vectors 
K°S'
1(P*), KJ'V) are linearly independent since by multiplying r0 and 
n by \V
1(p*) - V°(p*)} according to the box product, the vectors r0 
and ri are affected by the same proportion in the same coordinates 
so that no relative change across the coordinates is induced. 
STEP 2. Define the matrix £s(p*) := 








LS be the function specified by 
0s(p,q,6) := (F,*)(p,9),Sa(p*)-« 
for each (p,«, 5) ePxQx A
i+1. Since we can perturb utility func-




>*), for each i e I\{0}, are changed, maintaining (F,$)(p*,q*) 
unaffected at the CE prices' (p*, q*), we obtain that ft(J)W) ffl 0 for 
each (u,u) £ T4, where T4 C T is a generic set. Now, since the di-
mension of the range of ft(u>w)  exceeds that of the domain, for each 
4 In their proof GP claim that by assuming that there exists a portfolio 8e 
H
A+1 such that r(s)-0#O for each seS, and (possibly) by relabelling assets, one 
obtains that ro(s)^0 for each seS. However, easy examples show that such an 




is linearly independent, that there exists a portfolio 9=(1,1) such that r(s)-8^0 
for each s=0,l,2, and that yet not all the coordinates of the two payoff vectors 
are different from zero. Nevertheless, the proof does not make use either of that 
assumption or of the result stated by GP. SUBOPTIMALITY RESULT 127 
(«,w) € T4 there is no 6 € A
1 such that Es(p*) • 6 = 0 so that 
rank [Ea(p*)] = / + 1. 
The result yields since state s was chosen arbitrarily. B 
REMARK 4. Since the linear independence property in Proposition 
4 is stated for at least LS of the coordinates of the vectors in a set 
of size 7 + 1, then 7 + 1 < LS appears as a necessary condition 
for this result to hold. By assuming that 7 < LS, such a condition 
is satisfied. CKV do not impose an upper bound on the number of 
agents. They can achieve the constrained suboptimality result so 
long as they consider a policy with lump-sum transfers among agents 
in period 0. This allows them to control directly the income effect 
vectors of the agents. Without direct transfers of goods, since the 
welfare of agents is affected by inducing changes in L(S + 1) relative 
prices, it is clear that there must be an upper bound on the number 
of agents. Indeed Mas-Colell (1987) provides an example that shows 
that Theorem T does not hold if the upper bound on I is removed. 
5. Marginal Utility of Income 
In this section we obtain two properties of the agents' marginal utili-
ties of income. The first property shows that, generically, the agents' 
ratios of marginal utilities across states do not coincide, a fact that is 
strictly derived from the market incompleteness. This fact also drives 
the result stated in the second property. 
PROPOSITION 5. Assume A.l, A.2 (i), (in), and (iv), then, at each 
CE of an economy in a generic set of economies T5 C T, we have 
for each i,j e 1, such that i / j and each s,s' eS such that s ^ s'. 
PROOF. Define the set YR := {y 6 M
5+
1
 : y • R = [0]
T}. From 
Assumption A.2 (i) and (hi), we know that rank (R) = A + 1 and 
5 + 1 > A + 1 so that YR is generated by a vector space of dimension 
greater than or equal to one. Fix an arbitrary S € S, consider a subset 
of A + 1 states ScS\ {S}, ordered as s0, su..., sA, set ms := 0 for 
each s i S such that a ^ S, and let m-s £ 0 be an arbitrary number. 
Then, the equation -ys • r(S) = Eses ^ • r(s) has a solution since, by 128 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Assumption A.2 (iv), each set of A + 1 vectors that can be extracted 
from the set {r(0), r(l),..., r(S)} is linearly independent so that they 
SDan TR
A+1 It follows that we can pick a vector v £ Yp \ iOl even 
though at least one coordinate is arbitrarily pre-specified. 
Now, consider a CE of an economy {u,u>) £ T. For an agent 
i 6 I, we have that AI**[?*]
t = A** • R specifies the condition (cl) 
obtained earlier for his optimal choice of an asset portfolio. Take two 
agents, i,j el, i / j, and two states s, s' £ S, s ^ s'. Perturb the 
utility function of agent i in a way such that a vector denoted by n = 
(vo, Vi, • • • ,Vs) e R
n, where Vs •= (vos, Vis, • VLs) for each s £ 5, 
is added to the derivative D iuHx**) and accordingly the vector A** 
is perturbed by the addition of a vector AA
4 Using condition (c2) 
obtained earlier, for the optimal choice of goods of agent * we know 
that the vectors v and AA* must satisfy the equality v = p* a AA*. 
By the properties of the set YR, it is possible to choose a AA
1 £ 
MR such that either AAS ^ 0 or AA*, / 0. We use this to construct 
the utility perturbation described above. That perturbation does not 
affect the optimal choice of assets of agent i since 
(A** + AA*) • R = A** • R + AA* • R = A** • R + [0}
T = \** • R. 
In addition, we must compensate the change induced in the de-
mand of agent %. We do this by adding the appropriate amount to his 
vector of endowments w* so as to leave his excess demand unaffected. 
















for each (p,q,S) £ V x Q x A
2. Since the perturbation of utilities 
and endowments specified above changes the vector (A**, A*,*) leaving 
(F,*)(p*,?*) unaffected at the CE prices (p*,?*), then <p^a,(u>ll>) rjl 0 
for each (U,UJ) e T5, where T5 C T is a generic set. Now, since the 
dimension of the range of ^s,(liti)) exceeds that of the domain, by 
applying the Regular Value Theorem, we obtain that, for such a set SUBOPTIMALITY RESULT 129 
of economies, there is no S e A
2 such that 6 • Ts(,(p*) = [0]
r, i.e., the 
rank of matrix T^, (p*) is 2, as required. B 
PROPOSITION 6. Assume A.l, A.2 (i), (in), and (iv), then, given 
6 := {Si0,Sh,...,SiL) e A
i+
1
 such that 8io 56 0, there exists a set 
of L + 1 agents, {i0, h,..., iL} C I, such that, at each CE of an 
economy in a generic set V5 e T, we have 0 ^ 6ioXs°* ± 6imX8™* for 
at least S states, for each me {1,2,..., L}. 
PROOF. Since, from Assumption A.l, the problem (p) has only in-
terior solutions, then A** ^ 0 for each i e I and each s e S at a 
CE. 
_ Consider an agent i0 e I, a subset of states 5 C <S such that 
#<S := S, and pick a 6 := (6^,6^,. ..,SiL)e A
L+
l
 such that 6io / 0. 
By assuming that I > 2L, we are able to either 
(a) Extract from I\ {¿0} a set of agents {n, i2,..., iL} Cl\{i0} 
for which 8ioXs°* ^ ^Aj-* for each m e {1,2,..., L] and each 
s e S, so that the result stated in Proposition 6 holds, or 
(b) Extract from I\{i0} a set of agents {juj2,..., jL} C l\{i0} 
suchjhat 6jmXt* = SioXf*, for each m e {1,2,..., L}, for some 
a e S. Then, by using the result stated in Proposition 5, we know 
that 3^ / for each m e {1, 2,..., L}, for each s e S\{s}, and 
for each (u,w)'e T5. Therefore, by specifying the set 5 := <S \ {s}, 
we obtain that <5ioAi°* ± <5imA*
m* for each m e {1, 2,..., L}, for each 
s e S, for each (u, UJ) e T5, as required. a 
6. A Result from Linear Algebra 
We will exploit the following Lemma in the next section. 
LEMMA 1. Given a set of L non-zero numbers {a0, au...,aL} such 
that a0 am for each m e {1,2,..., L}, and a set of L linearly in-
dependent vectors of dimension L, {vu ...,vL), any vector aQ YL=X 
amvm - Ylm=i
 amOtmVm, of dimension L, can be generated by suit-
ably choosing the set of numbers {aua2,aL}. 
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7. Proof of the Result 
In this section we provide the proof of Theorem T by making use of 
the various arguments presented up to now. 
First, we specify the generic set of economies that are strongly 
regular, Proposition 2, and for which the results stated in Proposition 
3, Proposition 4, and Proposition 6 are satisfied as f := n|=2rfe. 
Consider a CE {x* ,9* ,p* ,q*) of a given economy («,w) G f. Let 
us recall that the key procedure to prove Theorem T is to show that 
the matrix $(x*,P*, 0*) defined in section 3 has full rank for a generic 
set of economies. Since we are interested in proving a generic feature, 
we need to perturb the economy (u,w). We do this by setting an 
additive perturbation that induces (u,w) to move to a neighboring 
economy, that is, 
where AUJ and Au denote, respectively, the perturbation to endow-
ments and the perturbation to utilities. 
Let us describe first the perturbation to endowments. 
Consider a set of L +1 agents {i0, h,..., iL} C J and a subset of 
states S C S, #S = 5, ordered as su • • •, «5- Set {s} :=S\S. Con-
sider, for each s 6 S, an arbitrary set of numbers {7is,72s, • • • ,7LS}-
Then, the vector ALU is specified as: 
(a) Aw
1 :=0for each i $ {i0,h,... ,iL}, 
(b) For each m 6 {1, 2,..., L} and each s e S; 
(U,UJ)  (u,w) + (Au,Aw), 
(Aa&)(Aw£)...)Aw£)): 
(Au&)7m. 
and Au>l™ := 0, 
(c) For each s G <S; 
A^ = (A^,(A^---,A<)): 
and A4°  •= 0. SUBOPTIMALITY RESULT 131 
In addition, for each m e {0,1,..., L} and each s e S, Awj" is 
specified as to satisfy 
L 
¡=1 
so that the income of agent im in state s € «S remains unaffected. 
For i e X, let Az
i denote the change induced in the excess de-
mand of agent i by the perturbation of endowments. We note that 
the perturbation to endowments does not change the optimal choices 
of any agent since it leaves unaffected the budget constraints of the 
agents in each state. Also, it satisfies 
(i) A£* = 0 for each i £ {»„, 
(ii) A£<- = 7™ [KHP*) - v;o(p*)] for each m e {1, 2,..., L} 
and each seS, 
(hi) Az?> = - £™=i 7™ [V>(p*) - V^ip*)] for each s e 5, 
and 
(iv) A£l
m = 0 for each m e {0,1,..., £}. 
These changes in the excess demands of the agents translate into 
a change of the matrix i>(x*) which we denote by A^(x*). Then, for 
an arbitrary vector 6 := («„, *i,..., 5/) e A
i+
1
 we obtain the change 
induced in 8 • A* • i>(x*) by the specified perturbation on endowments 
as 
5 • A • Aip(x ) — 2_^8i\ • Az = ^imA
 m • Az
 m 
z=0 m=0 
since AF = 0 for each i <£ {»„,*i,... ,iL}. 
Upon substituting for each A£*™, we obtain 
m=l 
5-A*-A^(x*) = -«io ( ^ £ 7rMl [V^(p*) - C(p*)]





 XI°SS 1^ 132 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 




... [of ... 
L 
+ X ^"^m^ [^(P*) - ^s°(f*)]
T ), 
m=l ' 
so that there are 5 + 1 blocks of L dimensional row vectors of which 
one block, the one that corresponds to state s, is a vector of zeros. 
We recall that to complete the proof of Theorem T we must 




6-§{x*,P*,e*) = 6-\* -^{x*) a \DpGip\e*)]-
1 -K{p*) = [of. 
So, let 6 e A
/+
1
 be such that 6k > 0 for some i0 e X. Use 
the result in Proposition 6 to specify a set of L + 1 agents, denoted 
{¿0, h,..., iL}, and a set of states S, such that 0 ^ <5ioAs°* ^ 6im\\™* 
for each s e S and each m 6 {1,2, ...,£}. Use the specified set of 
agents and the set S of states to construct the endowment perturba-
tion specified above with -f-vi TO » I ç p ç being arbitrary 
m,mW Fnr^rh <= k »™ïv V™ T with A w!' „,,„•! 
X roTe ofT ^rV fn i n Sri, Tr i ï S 
the role of {aT,a2 «L}V and[with the setof vectors\{V *'<>*)-
i/Wp*) ^^(p^-yio/p *) v
iL(p*)-V
io(p*)} playing the role of 
{vi,..., vL}. The Lemma can be applied by invoking the spanning SUBOPTIMALITY RESULT 133 
result obtained Proposition 3. It follows that any vector S-\* -Atp(x*) 
with LS non-zero coordinates can be generated by ^suitably picking 
the set of numbers (71., 72*,..., ILS\ for each s € S since LS of its 
coordinates can be controlled independently. 
The perturbation of endowments specified above also changes the 
matrix DpG(p*, 6*) which we now analyze. Consider a given state s € 
S. For i e 1, let ADPs[#(p*, 0**) - CJ\] and ADPsGs(P*,9*) denote 
the changes induced, respectively, in the matrices DPs j#(p*, 0**)-^] 
and DPaG,(p*,0*), by the perturbation of endowments. The Slutsky 
decomposition of the matrix DPs 6'*) - w*] gives us
5 
DP.[giiP*, O - ¿.1 = Af JTj(p') - v;(p') • [ai{P\ O - a*]
7, 
where is a symmetric matrix of dimension L x L. We note 
that A**, Ki(p*) and V^(p*) for i e I and s e S are not affected 
by the specified perturbation of endowments since income, and hence 
demand, are not affected. Now, by making use of the induced changes 
to the excess demands of the agents, A£*, and the fact that, for s € S, 
ADPsGs(p*,6*) = EiALV&G?*,*
1*) -£*], we obtain that 
L 







X 7m, [v;-(p*) - v;»(p*)] • [v>(p*) - ^°(P*)]
T . 
m=l 





 C»*il as b\
m for each m £ il 2 Lì- and each l e £ \ iOl Bv 
writing out the product above, we'obtain the matrix of dimension 
L x L, 








E 7ms&ll&2s  E7-
m=l 
(10) 
which happens to be symmetric. 
Let us now describe the perturbation to utilities, AM. Consider 
an agent i e 2, and construct Au by placing a quadratic term, that 
we now describe, in the coordinate that corresponds to agent i, and 
by placing zeros in the other coordinates. This quadratic term is 
such that the linear term subsequently added to the vectors of first 
derivatives of amounts to zero at the CE. Hence, it leaves aggregate 
demand unaffected, but changes the matrix of second derivatives of 
u\
e Furthermore, this quadratic term induces, for each s e S, a 
change m the matrix KJ(p ) by the addition of a symmetric matrix 
that cancels out with the matrix m (10) above 
Since from Assumption A 3 a variation of ps only affects excess 
demand at state s, we have that the perturbation (Au, Au;) specified 
above is such that [DpG(p*,0*)\ is not changed. Therefore, it gen-
erates the vector 5 • X* • AiP{x*) • [DpG(p*, 0*)]'
1 as desired for at 
least LS of its coordinates. Now, from the result stated in Proposition 
4, any matrix obtained from A(p*) by dropping the vectors that cor-
respond to any state has at least I + 1 linearly independent rows and 
thus we can choose the perturbation (Au, Au,) as to generate non-
zero entries in those components of 6 • X* • $(x*) • [DpG(p* 
that correspond to some jet of I + 1 linearly independent rows from 
A(p*). It follows thati-A*-V(x*) • [DpG(p*, 6*)]~
l • A(p*) £ [0]
T is 
guaranteed. Then, by applying a transversality argument^we obtain 
that 8 • <S>{x*,p*,6*) ^ [0]
T for each (u,w) € V, where T C f is a 
generic set. 
6 It is known that by adding a suitable quadratic term to u\ one can induce 
any perturbation of the matrix *:>*), for ¿61 and seS, by the addition of a 
symmetric matrix. See, e.g., Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1980). SUBOPTIMALITY RESULT 135 
Since 6 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that the matrix $(x*,p*, 
9*) has rank I + 1 for a generic set of economies T. This completes 
the proof of Theorem T. 
REMARK 5. The GP result holds for a generic set of economies. Of 
course, there are non-generic economies for which some CE are not 
CS. As in GP,consider an economy («,w) e T for which there is a 
CE such that no agent trades any good at any state. Then, clearly, 
the last term in equation (3) amounts to zero and, therefore, the 
contribution to the change of utility of each agent due to the change in 
relative prices vanishes. So, given a reallocation of asset holdings d9, 
du(x*) only captures the effect of a pure redistribution of income and, 
therefore, no improvement can be induced. However, we know that 
the economy (u,w) belongs to a non-generic set since, by changing 
slightly the parameter w, we move to a new economy such that some 
agents trade at each CE, which implies that the set that contains 
(U,OJ) is not open. 
REMARK 6. One would like to know whether the bound on the number 
of agents is tight. If LS < I + 1 < L(S + 1), then the argument given 
to prove Theorem T fails to hold. To see this notice that, since the 
result obtained in Proposition 6 is in terms of ratios across states, 
one state must be dropped and used as a reference. Therefore, we 
are able only to control LS coordinates of the vector S • X* • Aip(x*). 
Therefore, to show that the matrix $(x*,p*, 9*) has rank I + 1, the 
set of vectors 
{r0 • \V
1(p*) — V°(p*)], TQ D [V
1 (p*) — V°(p*)], r\ • [V
1(p*)-V°(p*)]} 
needs to be linearly independent when considering any LS coordinates 
of them, which can be achieved only if 1+1 < LS, a condition which is 
satisfied by imposing I < LS as stated in the hypotheses of Theorem 
T. 
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